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1. INTRODUCTION 
Two types of informal self-help financial groups are common 
in low-income countries--sometime intertwined: those that 
accumulate funds (ASCAS) which are used for various purposes--
including lending--and those that collect and then systematically 
distribute funds in rotation (ROSCAS) to each group member 
(Bouman 1994) . Of the two, ROSCAS are the most interesting: they 
are found in many low-income countries and researchers report 
that many people and large amounts of funds are involved in them 
(e.g., Adams and Canavesi 1992). Because most studies of ROSCAS 
have been snapshots there are few insights in the literature on 
the evolution of these groups. Some observers have argued that 
ROSCAS are rudimentary institutions that wither as more 
sophisticated forms of financial intermediation emerge (e.g., 
Geertz 1962). Other observers have documented the metamorphose 
of ROSCAS into formal financial institutions (e.g., Izumida 
1992). In the discussion that follows we suggest still another 
evolutionary path. We describe a ROSCA in Cameroon that uses 
bids to determine the rotation of funds among group members and 
go on to suggest that some self-help financial groups may adapt 
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to new economic opportunities by becoming more sophisticated, yet 
still remain informal. 
2. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF ROSCAS 
In their most elementary form ROSCAs are comprised of a 
group of individuals who each make periodic contributions to a 
pot that is then given to one member in rotation (Ardener 1964) . 
Each participant typically contributes the same amount of money 
and the rotation of the pot is determined by lot. After all 
members receive a pot, the group may disband, may be reformed 
with some members exiting and new members entering, or the same 
group may simply recycle. Typically membership is restricted to 
individuals who work for the same business, or who are relatives, 
friends, or neighbors. 
ROSCAs are similar to banks since both do financial 
intermediation. In a ROSCA where rotation is determined by lot, 
the first person receiving the pot obtains an interest-free loan 
from other members of the group and then repays the loan in equal 
installments through contributions in subsequent rotations until 
the loan is entirely repaid in the last rotation. The final 
person in the rotation is a pure saver who receives back their 
deposits: the total amount they lent to others during the cycle 
of the ROSCA. Members between those who receive the first and 
last rotation switch from being depositors to being borrowers 
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when they receive their pots. The half of the members who 
receive pots early in the rotation are net borrowers, while the 
other half are net savers in the ROSCA. 
A variety of reasons explain the popularity of these groups. 
They impose few transaction costs on members, they build mutual 
trust, they provide insurance or reciprocity that can be called 
upon in times of emergency, they allow members to access 
relatively large amounts of funds that may otherwise be difficult 
to assemble, they provide a desirable form of compulsory savings, 
and they allow all members--except the last recipient--to 
marshall a predetermined amount of money more quickly than is 
possible through autonomous savings. 
From the standpoint of ideal financial intermediation, 
rudimentary ROSCAS have at least four limitations, however. 
First, because of their small size and reliance on personal 
relationships they are unable to intermediate among individuals 
who are separated by substantial distance. Since the economic 
conditions of group members are often similar their capacity to 
save and their demand for loans likewise tend to be similar and 
move up and down together, thus lessening the opportunities for 
gains from financial intermediation that might occur over a 
larger geographic space among individuals whose financial 
requirements were more heterogeneous. 
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Second, because of their relatively small size, ROSCAS are 
unable to provide large and long-term loans. These types of 
loans are easier for the formal financial system to offer. 
Third, because members must wait their turn to obtain the 
pot, ROSCAS provide discontinuous access to funds; an elementary 
ROSCA only provides a loan to a member once in the group's cycle. 
A ROSCA is thus less able to satisfy emergency needs than is, 
say, a credit card or a line-of-credit that allows a series of 
multiple loans on demand. 
Fourth, funds are efficiently allocated if they go to the 
individual who has the highest expect marginal returns from the 
use of additional liquidity. Because an elementary ROSCA 
typically determines the allocation of pots by lot there may be a 
mismatch between who receives the pot in a given rotation and who 
has an investment opportunity with the highest expected rate of 
return. For example, the individual who draws last in the 
rotation may have an investment alternative with expected returns 
that are much higher than the person who wins the first pot. In 
some cases this high-return opportunity may disappear before the 
last rotation of the ROSCAS. In other cases, the receiver of an 
early pot may encounter several high-return investment 
alternatives subsequently that they are unable to capitalize on 
because the ROSCA only provides each member one discontinuous 
shot of liquidity. 
5 
3. ROSCA INNOVATIONS 
Various innovations have allowed members to overcome some of 
the limitations in elementary ROSCAS. The size limitation of 
ROSCAS turns out to be the most difficult weakness to overcome. 
If the size of the group is sharply expanded and more diverse 
individuals are included, group solidarity deteriorates and the 
ROSCA is less able to screen members for creditworthiness and to 
employ informal sanctions that assure compliance with group 
norms. At least in Ghana, relatively large ROSCAS, however, are 
managed by commission agents--susu collectors--who regularly 
collect and distribute funds without members of the group 
necessarily knowing each other (Steel and Aryeetey 1994) . In 
some cases collectors also provide emergency loans to members. 
The main problem with this system is assuring collectors' 
honesty, something that might be enhanced by a bonding service. 
ROSCAS have some latitude to grow in membership size and in 
volume of funds handled and thereby provide larger loans and 
longer-term loans to group members. This may occur as the 
incomes of members increase and as the group or the organizer is 
able to screen additional individuals for membership. For 
example, sophisticated merchants have used ROSCAS in Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, and Bolivia to sell cars, furniture, other 
consumer durables, and real estate using relatively long-term 
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loans. Large and long-term ROSACS have also been common in India 
(Nayar 1973). 
A variety of innovations are also used to lessen the 
discontinuous-liquidity problem in ROSCAS and to deal with 
emergencies. In some cases members split shares so that two or 
more people divide a single pot. This may involve two members 
dividing the first and the last pot in the rotation to allow 
access to additional liquidity twice for each individual instead 
of just once in each cycle of the ROSCA. Also, where membership 
in the ROSCA is stable, the order of the rotation may be adjusted 
in subsequent cycles so that individuals who receive their pots 
early in one cycle receive a pot late in the next cycle. An even 
more common practice is to append an ASCA to a ROSCA to provide 
emergency loans to ROSCA members out of the funds accumulated in 
the ASCA (Hospes 1992). 
Several measures are also commonly used to allocate funds 
more efficiently than might otherwise occur from simply 
distributing pots by lot. One method is to allow the leader to 
distribute the pot on the basis of perceived need after lobbying 
by the members who have not yet received a pot. The main danger 
in using this procedure is that some members may feel unfairly 
treated and thereby undermine the solidarity of the group. There 
are fewer problems if a member is able to renegotiate their 
position informally with other accommodating members. 
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A still more efficient method of determining the rotation of 
ROSCA distributions is the use of bids, a technique conunonly used 
in East Asia. The bid may take the form of either a discount or 
a premium. A discount results in non-winning members paying less 
than their normal share to the winner of the bid, the member who 
bids the largest discount being the winner of the pot auctioned. 
The premium system involves the winner of the bid paying more 
than the normal share later to other members of the group for the 
right to receive the pot. The most attractive feature of the 
auction is that members of the group who have not received a 
distribution are able to express the intensity of their interest 
in obtaining the pot through bids, thus allocating funds to the 
member who is most likely to realize the largest benefit from the 
use of additional funds. 
One question that has not been adequately answered in the 
literature is why do some ROSCAS employ these sophisticated 
bidding methods to allocate funds while others do not? In the 
following discussion we argue that the more efficient allocation 
of funds that results from bidding may be prompted by economic 
growth that substantially increases the dispersion of expected 
economic returns from additional investments among members of a 
ROSCA, thus enhancing the economic returns to institutional 
innovations. 
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3. ROSCAS IN CAMEROON 
There are probably more publications about ROSCAS in 
Cameroon than there are on this topic for any other African 
country (see list of references). These studies show that ROSCAS 
exist in all ten Provinces and are called tontines among French 
speakers and djanggi in many other parts of the country. They 
are particularly popular among the Bamileke--the ethnic group of 
the West Province (Soen and Comarmond 1972)--and among 
inhabitants in the two anglophone Provinces: Northwest and 
Southwest (Harteveld 1972). Studies also show a variety of forms 
that range from the most elementary, through groups that combine 
ROSCAS and ASCAS, to groups that have evolved into formal banks 
(Haggblade 1978). Schrieder and Cuevas estimate that nearly 80 
percent of the adults in Cameroon participate in self-help 
financial groups (ASCAS or ROSCAS), that these groups handle 
about one-quarter of the total volume of money lent in the 
country, and that they manage about one-half of total financial 
savings nationwide. 
4. A SOPHISTICATED SELF-HELP FINANCE GROUP IN CAMEROON 
Although not connnon, an increasing number of urban ROSCAS in 
Cameroon use bids to determine the rotation of the pot. No 
systematic study has been done of their relative importance, but 
9 
a case study of one of these sophisticated groups may clarifying 
their operations and also provide clues on their genesis. 
In the early 1980s four individuals who were Bamilekes 
living in Yaounde, all from Foto Village located in West 
Province, formed a self-help financial group with the name of 
"Amica! des Ressortisants Foto" (AMIRFO) . Gradually other 
individuals from Foto Village who were working in Yaounde were 
added to the group until the total number of members reached 
about 40, all men. Most of the members were government 
employees, private sector workers, or businessmen. The criteria 
for membership included that the person was from Fote Village, 
that they lived in Yaounde, that they had a steady source of 
income, and that they be in the middle- or upper-income strata. 
New members were only admitted if sponsored by two current 
members. 
From the start the group had social as well as economic 
objectives. Monthly meetings were generally organized around a 
dinner and professional networking. An additional objective was 
to help members to advance economically. The agenda also 
included collecting money ad hoc for community improvement 
projects in their home village, such as building a bridge, 
repairing the roof of the school, and improving the drinking 
water system. Initially, the group managed just one fund, a 
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ROSCA. As membership grew two other ASCA funds were added: first 
a social fund and then later a loan fund that made short-term 
loans. 
The social fund provided modest life and health insurance to 
members. For instance, if a member of the group died the widow 
received the equivalent of about US$2,400 (1$=250CFA) from the 
fund; in case of hospitalization for more than 3 days, the member 
also received about US$10; beyond three days the assistance was 
limited to about US$20 per week. Each member of the group was 
obligated to contribute about US$144 to the social fund on 
joining the group. The social fund was recapitalized at the end 
of each year by requiring members to pay additional quotas. The 
group's objective was to hold an average of about US$5,000 in the 
fund. During the 1980s the payout each year averaged about 30 to 
40 percent of this amount. Occasionally, some of the idle money 
in the social fund was lent to members for short periods. Unused 
funds were deposited in a bank. 
Another loan fund was used to meet emergency needs of the 
members. The interest rate charged on loans from this fund was 3 
percent per month with a repayment period of 3 months. After 
three months, the interest on the unpaid balance was raised to 5 
percent monthly for the next three months, then to 10 percent 
monthly until the loan was repaid. All loans from the fund were 
to be repaid by the end of November each year. On average, about 
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half the members of the group participated in this fund and each 
contributed about US$600 each to it yearly. Only members who had 
contributed to the fund, however, were eligible to borrow from 
it. At the end of the year members who contributed to the fund 
were allowed to borrow all or part of their contribution to the 
fund without interest for one month. This practice was introduced 
to allow members of the association to satisfy their financial 
obligations during December. The earnings from the fund were 
distributed to fund contributors each year in proportion to their 
initial contributions to the fund. 
5. OPERATIONS OF THE ROSCA 
The third fund started as an elementary ROSCAS that evolved 
with the growth in membership. Participation in the ROSCA was 
not mandatory, but more than 90 percent of individuals in AMIRFO 
usually joined. Initially, ROSCA participants met monthly, 
collected a fixed amount from each member and then immediately 
gave the pot to one member in rotation based on a lottery. As 
the group grew and membership became more heterogeneous this 
elementary form of ROSCA was unable to meet the increasingly 
complex financial requirements of individuals in the group. Some 
members wished to save more per month than the prescribed share, 
while others were able to save less than the normal share. As 
the number of members grew, it was no longer possible to complete 
the rotation in 12 months, something that was desirable because 
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of holiday commitments during December. Some members of the 
group also objected to using a lottery--luck--to allocate the 
pot, and instead argued it should be distributed on the basis of 
need, thereby threatening group cohesion. 
Because elementary procedures did not satisfy some of the 
financial needs of members, AMIRFO designed more sophisticated 
mechanisms that tailored each member's share in the ROSCA to 
their individual savings capacity and allowed access to a pot any 
time during the cycle through competitive biding. Multiple 
winners of the pot were allowed to overcome the lumpiness-of-
liquidity-access problem and to force the cycle to terminate 
within 12 months regardless of the number of participants. These 
innovations were induced by changes in the economic capacities of 
members, by changes in economic opportunities in general, and by 
the challenges of operating a larger self-help financial group. 
Initially, the members of AMIRFO considered meeting diverse 
savings requirements by managing three elementary ROSCAS: one 
with large-sized shares, a second with medium-sized shares, and a 
third with small-sized shares. This was rejected because it 
might undermine group cohesion and leave unsolved the problem of 
how the pots were allocated. The innovation eventually selected 
was to continue with one ROSCA, employ bids to allocate pots, and 
to institute a standard savings unit. The standard minimum 
savings unit was defined as the equivalent of about US$200 each 
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month, with each member being able to subscribe to fractional or 
multiple standard shares. For example, a members could subscribe 
to a half share and contribute just $100 per month, or subscribe 
to five shares and contribute $1,000 per month to the pot. 
Members could adjust the amount they wished to save in AMIRFO at 
the start of each new cycle. Members who wished to receive 
portions of several pots could also subscribe to say two savings 
shares, withdraw the projected savings from one share early in 
the rotation, and then withdraw the projected savings on the 
other share in a later rotation. These adjustments reinforced 
group solidarity, better tailored the savings services to the 
diverse savings capacities of the members, allowed allocation of 
the pots in ways that did not undermine group cohesion, allowed 
members more access to liquidity, and also resulted in more 
efficient allocation of funds among participants. 
A hypothetical example using only a four-member group that 
operates over just a 4 month cycle illustrates the procedures 
used in the larger and more complex AMIRFO ROSCA. Before 
starting the cycle, the group sets the standard saving unit for 
each member at the equivalent of US$200. One member (A), 
however, is unable to save this much each month and opts to 
contribute a half share of US$100. Another member (B) wishes to 
save more than the standard share and opts to contribute two 
shares, or a total of US$400 each month. With the monthly 
contributions of c and D of $200 each, the pot amounts to $900 
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each month ($100 + $400 + $200 + $200). Before the cycle begins 
the group also decides on a minimum discount bid of $10 per 
savings unit that will be permitted in determining who gets each 
pot. 
A month later the group meets, assembles its pot of $900, 
and receives discount bids from members who are interested in 
borrowing an amount from the pot equal to the total amount of 
money they are scheduled to contribute during the next four 
months. Member A is scheduled to save a total of $400, B a total 
of $1600, and C and D a total of $800 each over the planned cycle 
of the ROSCA. Since the first pot is just $900, only members A, 
c, and D submit discount bids the first rotation; the first pot 
is not large enough to match the projected contributions of 
member B so he sits out the bidding, waiting for a later round. 
If in this rotation member A submits the largest discount bid per 
saving share and it is $80, then A would receive his projected 
savings of $400 less his discount bid of $40 ($80 x .5) for a net 
of $360 from the pot. The remaining amount ($540) would be 
carried forward and added to the pot in the second rotation 
($900) for a total of $1,440. 
Only members C and D could bid in the second round; there is 
still not enough money in the pot to cover all of B's projected 
savings, and A would be ineligible to bid since he has already 
withdrawn his projected savings, less the discount paid for 
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receiving an early pot. If D submitted the highest discount bid 
in the second rotation and it was $60, then D would receive from 
the pot his projected savings of $800 less the $60 discount, for 
a total of $740. The remaining $700 would be carried forward and 
added to the $900 pot of the third round, for a total of $1,600. 
In round three B and C could bid. If B submitted the 
highest bid of $50 then he would receive his projected savings of 
$1,600 less $100 ($50 x 2) from the pot ($1,500) with $100 being 
carried forward and added to the last pot--that would then be 
worth $1,000. 
By default C would win the last pot for the minimum discount 
bid of $10. He would, therefore, receive his total savings of 
$800 less the $10 discount for a total of $790. The remaining 
$210 in the pot would then be distributed back to the members on 
a pro rata basis, depending on how many savings units the members 
paid: A = one-half, B = 2, and C and D = 1 each for a total of 
4.5 units. Given this formula, A would receive a rebate of 
$23.33, Ba rebate of $93.33, and C and D would each receive a 
refund of $46.67. 
In this example, after rebate, member A who drew the first 
pot would pay an annualized interest of about 14 percent on his 
loan while C who drew last would receive an annualized return on 
his deposits of about 18 percent. Members B and D would each pay 
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a small amount for their short-term loans. One might expect the 
spread to increase between the effective rate of interest paid by 
net borrowers and received by net savers as the size of the group 
is increased and when the ROSCA operates over a longer time 
period than is described here. 
The actual operation of the AMIRFO ROSCA was more complex 
than is depicted in this simple example. In most cases three or 
four members received portions of the pot in each rotation. The 
cycle of the group also usually finished before the prescribed 12 
months because gains from discount bids allowed the carryforward 
of sufficient funds to allow paying off all projected savings 
early, sometimes in as little as 10 months. It was also corrnnon 
for members to decide to use their rebates from the ROSCAS to 
meet their annual funding obligations in the other two ASCAS 
operated by AMIRFO. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
It should not be surprising to find individuals remodelling 
social-economic institutions such as ROSCAs to fit changing 
conditions. The AMIRFO example is a case where both the loan and 
deposit side of informal financial intermediation were retailored 
to satisfy the evolving financial demands of its members. On the 
savings side, making the amount that could be deposited each 
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rotation flexible provided the growing group a variety of deposit 
options, thus accormnodating members who wished to deposit both 
large and small amounts. On the loan side, similar size-
flexibility was provided along with innovations that allowed 
individual members to have more flexibility over when they could 
access additional liquidity. 
The AMIRFO example also illustrates several important 
features of developing countries that are of ten ignored by 
government officials and donor employees as they attempt to prod 
development with credit. Even in a relatively homogeneous group 
such as the men who participated in AMIRFO, there is a wide 
dispersion in their demand for financial services at any given 
time. On a given date some members of the group were willing to 
pay quite high rates of interest to obtain a loan quickly that 
they could use to capitalise on a transitory business opportunity 
or household requirement. At the same time, many other members 
were content to deposit their funds and receive attractive rates 
of return on their savings, possibly because they lacked high-
return investment alternatives at the time. All individuals in 
the groups also benefited from the variety of explicit and 
implicit forms of insurance that were involved in membership: the 
explicit life-and-health facilities, the opportunity to have 
access to several credit facilities that could be called on in 
times of emergency, and the reciprocity and mutual trust 
engendered by being a member of a group--ultimately the most 
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dependable form of insurance in all societies. This diversity of 
financial requirements is typically not well served by inflexible 
targeted credit programs that ignore deposit mobilization and 
insurance. 
Flaws in formal financial systems are a major reason for the 
emergence of sophisticated ROSCAS, such as those found in 
Cameroon. A similar evolution of ROSCAS in other African 
countries might be expected as economic conditions improve, 
especially where formal financial systems continue to perform 
poorly. 
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